

East Indies - East India Company

OBSERVATIONS on the President's Minute of 25th June 1783, communicated by me to the Select Committee 23d July following,

(Signed) J. S.

Fort St. George, July 23, 1783.

ON Saturday, the 19th of July, the Minutes or Proceedings in Committee, held the 25th of June last, were sent to me by Mr. Secretary Huddleston; I see there a Minute (of 30* pages) framed by the Right Honourable President, so personally injurious to me, and so replete with unjust, ungenerous, and illiberal attacks on my conduct as an officer, *when absent on the public service*, that, in self-defence, I trust I shall be allowed to treat it (now I am present) with the liberty never denied to the meanest British subject, and certainly the privilege of my station, had I been present in Committee to speak to it at the first, when it was given in, and as the *separate* performance of this individual President. I mean to do so now, without any reflection on the Government of which he and I are members, and in this light I desire it may be viewed, and sent home by the next dispatch.

* Referring to the written copy.

The Proceedings in Committee,
25th June 1783.

At a Select Committee,

P R E S E N T,

GEORGE Lord MACARTNEY, President,

Vice-Admiral Sir EDWARD HUGHES,

ANTHONY SADLIER, Esquire,

ALEXANDER DAVIDSON, Esquire,

MORGAN WILLIAMS, Esquire.

Major General STUART absent upon service.

THE President informs the Committee, that, agreeably to what he had yesterday the honour to communicate to them, he has thrown together, and will now submit to their consideration, his thoughts respecting the measures advisable to be pursued at this important juncture. In doing this, his Lordship observes, he has taken a retrospective view of circumstances, which may not at first appear so immediately connected with the points now to be considered, as they will be found to be in the conclusion of the Minute, to which he requests their attention.

Read accordingly the following Minute, given in by the President :

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(1.) *I*N general it is a repetition of what has already been dunned into the ears of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and of our Honourable Employers; together with a fourth view and exhibition (as I believe) of his Lordship's exclusive personal merit and cabinet generalship against the naked Dutch: his eminent services on that occasion have already been taken notice of in triplicate by the Honourable Court of Directors (but never once by the Honourable House of Commons), who at the same time noticed the impropriety of his dictatorial authority on the occasion. And here I cannot help observing the strange reasoning of this President, in challenging the exclusive powers given by the Board of Bengal to our late most able and deserving Commander in Chief, possessed of local knowledge, a soldier and a general of experience; which powers, in a case as nearly similar as possible, were exercised by this very President, though he neither had at the time, nor has he now, as I think, with all his knowledge, any claim, or any thing but a self-sufficient turn, the consequence of certain inherent qualities, to account for his ever assuming the exercise of such power.

There is, besides, an indelicacy in his now mentioning the name of our late worthy General, in the way of dispute or discussion, in matters that are passed, attempting to lower his reputation. The attempt is indeed equally absurd as ungenerous, because his services and his good name will remain in the page of English history without a question, and,

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(1.) *T*HE President has the honour to observe, that an encrease of duty and responsibility has lately fallen upon the Members of the Select Committee. Early in the war of the Carnatic, the Court of Directors had determined, that the Governor General and Council of Bengal should take the lead in all political and military operations in all the Company's Presidencies, and that the orders from Bengal should be implicitly obeyed. In a contest so extensive, carried on with so many powers, in places so distant from each other, and a contest of which the success might depend on connected operations, it was no doubt a necessary precaution, that those operations should proceed from one source; and the Presidency, which enjoyed already the controuling power in making war or peace, was the most likely to conduct the former, by the fittest means, for the speedy attainment of the latter.

The Governor General and * Council of Bengal, though they considered that this power implied an injunction to exercise it, did not exercise it, except in the instance of very properly recommending an expedition against the Dominions of Hyder Ally, on the Malabar Coast; but exercised another, in which they were not authorised, in desiring that Sir Eyre Coote, one of their Members, should have exclusively that

* Letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal to Select Committee of Fort St. George, on the subject of Sir Eyre Coote, July 4th, 1782.

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as I believe, without even the most distant comparison with those of this President.

The bringing himself forward as the Captain General against the Dutch, with the other remarks (in these three * pages) seems to be an awkward avant-propos, or prologue, to bring me forward on the stage, and I find myself, in absence as it were, by a bull gor'd; and pelted to the end of the performance: and now that I am present, I do not mean to suffer a rehearsal to pass entirely without a little correction. But what I am about to say in that way, will not be a studied compilation of words and sentences, grammatically connected with each other, however unconnected with real facts, or the real situation of things in practical service; for such in general is the performance I allude to.

(2.) The Honourable the Court of Directors, no less than their government in Bengal, have doubtless official people they confide in, for the assorting of all their various correspondence, and for comparing assertions with the standard of dates and facts; and as I wish them not to be guided solely by my representation, so I hope neither will they trust to the bare assertions of this Right Honourable President; concerning whom I had heard, among other great qualities he was endowed with, That of a retentive memory was most conspicuous; yet, on the present occasion, either that quality in him must have been much impaired, or he must suppose others, on their part, have lost it entirely, because every thing contained in

* Referring to the written copy.

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lead, which the Company meant to be the result of the deliberations of all the Members. Sir Eyre Coote had indeed the merit of cheerfully obeying the directions he had received, of repairing to the Carnatic, to take the command of troops diminished and disheartened by defeat. To his experience and reputation might be added, the confidence which the sepoys placed in his activity, bravery, and good fortune. There might have been room to hope, that particular circumstances in his favour warranted a deviation from the Company's system, of confiding the general plan of operations to the political judgment of the civil power, aided by military advice, and leaving the execution of such plans to the Military Commander alone.

The persons intrusted with the civil power in the preceding administration of this Government, had in fact invested Sir Eyre Coote with the conduct of the war. It remained before the present Members, not to consider whether they should give, but whether they should take away, the authority thus already delegated. They fulfilled as much as they could of their duty, without interrupting his operations, interfering with his command, or diminishing his strength: But, by the exertion of their remaining means, they partly, or alone, (1) took all the Dutch Settlements on the Coast of Coromandel, and within their reach. In the victories of Sir Eyre Coote they had no other share, than from the

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the space of his Minute (mentioned in the margin), where he states, or rather mistakes my conduct at the time of Hyder Ally's death, has been treated of over and over again many months ago; and on that subject at that time I was as roughly handled by his Lordship's quill, as his heavy hand was capable of.*

I supposed indeed it was now left to the judgment of others.—I still suppose so; and I have nothing now to add to what I then offered in answer, except my assertion, of equal currency, as I hope, with that of this President, namely, That, from facts and practical fair reasoning, every inculpation, or direct accusation of me, or of my conduct during that period, are entirely refuted.

(3.) In proceeding, however, through this draught of a Minute by Lord Macartney, I cannot help making a remark, on purpose to guard those who may read this, or other performances of his Lordship, against their drawing final conclusions on the first view of his statements. As for example, the Right Honourable President states at the end of the 4th page (talking of Hyder Ally's death), "that the in-
"action of the army on so critical an occa-
"sion, induced the Presidency of Bengal to
"lament that the cause of it should proceed
"from an Officer whom this Government
"had invested with the command of the
"army, and the whole conduct of military
"operations."—I beg it may be adverted to, that the Right Honourable President has left out, for very evident reasons, as I think, certain leading words with which the distinct separate paragraph*

* Referring to the written copy.

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monies they remitted, and the supplies they furnished to the army.—Of the want of any positive and solid advantage gained by that army, if such could have been gained by it, they are absolved from the demerit, as far as they could be absolved, by the precedent of their predecessors, and the desire of their Superiors of Bengal, not to meddle in it; and they had but little communication of what passed in it. But it was too apparent that Sir Eyre Coote exercised this exclusive command, in opposition to the system of all those who conferred it on him, and were refused the requisition of the Bombay Government for a reinforcement necessary to the projected attack of the enemy's possessions on the Malabar Coast. Since the Governor General and Council of Bengal absolved this Government from the necessity of complying with their former desire of leaving the exclusive command to Sir Eyre Coote, those exertions have been made by this Government, which by him (1.) had been omitted:—Troops were sent to the Malabar Coast, which, together with those from Bombay, made important conquests there; and had the important effect of obliging the successor of Hyder Ally to evacuate the Carnatic:—a sufficient number of troops was sent to the Circars and their neighbourhood, to prevent the temptation of an invasion by open enemies, or suspected neighbours: Tanjore and the Southern districts have not only been protected, but the adjoining pro-

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is connected.—The paragraph alluded to, is in the Letter from the Board of Bengal March 11th, and begins thus—"Uninformed of what General Stuart may have to produce in his own vindication against such heavy accusations, our regret is not lessened for the public misfortunes, nor can we prevent ourselves from lamenting, that the charge, if well founded, should fall upon an Officer whom you have invested with the command of the army, and the whole conduct of our military operations."—The real truth is, that the Government of Bengal, when the above Letter was wrote, had seen only one side of the question, and that, by some unaccountable accident, the hostile strictures on my conduct were not accompanied with my answers, as they might have been.—A partial communication took place (and, if I rightly remember), at a period similar to this late personal attack, when I was absent on service. I took notice of it in Committee immediately on my return, and I felt so indignant, that I wrote in consequence to the Board in Bengal, just before I went last on service. I now annex an Extract from that Letter; and I make bold to say, that no reflection to my prejudice, as an Officer or otherwise, has since come, I had almost said, or will ever come from that Honourable Board, after hearing both sides of any question*

* See my Minute (No 2.) in Committee, 23d March, and April 15th; also my Letter to the Board of Bengal, April 16th 1783.

** I find the references as in the written copy were erroneous, therefore are now corrected as in the above Note. 1784.

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vines of the enemy have been successfully invaded.

(2.) No effort remained for this Government, except that of taking proper and immediate advantage of the confusion in which the death of Hyder Ally, and the absence of his successor from his main army, occasioned in that army, as well as the fluctuating disposition of its several leaders. The obvious advantage to be taken in these circumstances, was by an immediate march of the Company's army in the Carnatic, or even of a detachment of it, towards the enemy; but such had been the previous disposition by Major General Stuart, on whom, by the absence of Sir Eyre Coote, the command devolved, of the means of moving the army, that, notwithstanding the desire and direction of the Select Committee, notwithstanding the promises of General Stuart, the army, or any considerable part of it, was not ready to march till the moment of advantage was passed, till long after Tippoo Saib returned from the Malabar coast, till his authority was fully established. General Stuart's conduct in this crisis, and the Committee's conduct, are explained at length in the President's Minute of the 18th of January last; and the General's Minute of the 29th of January, which was intended for his defence, is the fullest confirmation of the President's Minute, as the facts are not controverted or disproved; and the consequences from them are too obvious to be doubted.

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betwixt this Right Honourable President and me. But to proceed; his Lordship continues his old efforts to sap my authority as the Commander in Chief of his Majesty's troops, in the same manner as he had attempted to do towards our late Commander in Chief. But I don't know how it is, he can't get at the general argument without something personal; and, first, he gives my poor stump a clumsy knock with his fist; here again he seems to have lost his old pertinacious memory, forgetting that on a former occasion when he objected to my generalship, because he had heard I was drawn by bullocks in the field; my answer at that time, and to that objection, is pointedly on record; but since this President chuses to descend to personalities, and to touch old sores, I shall take this occasion to make one observation, and, however he may feel, I shall leave it with our Honourable Employers, and the general voice of the Settlement, to decide on the merits; when I presume to say, that with my remaining leg I am fully as equal to the station of General, as he is for that of President or Governor, with all the brains in his skull.

But to return to the President's strictures on the powers of the Commander in Chief of his Majesty's forces, though it is a worn-out topic; I have repeatedly said, and wrote to him, that his own separate opinion will be of no weight with me, who positively deny the power of the Honourable Company's United Governments to alter or innovate on the occasion.

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(3.) The inaction of the army on so critical an occasion induced the Presidency of Bengal to lament, that the cause of it should proceed from an Officer which this Government had invested with the command of the army, and the whole conduct of military operations. But this Government had not the misfortune to be answerable for investing that Officer with that command;—he was the Senior Officer on the Coast on the departure of Sir Eyre Coote;—he had by the regulations, or at least by the unvaried practice of the Company, a claim to the command;—he was intrusted and recommended by Sir Eyre Coote, though his conduct, after that General's departure for Bengal, had at least testified an inactivity, for which the wound he had received in this war might partly account; yet there remained difficulties in the removal of him from the command, which induced this Government to listen to the hope that his future exertions would atone for his past mistakes. The difficulties of such removal arose chiefly from the construction that was made, and the advantage taken, of a commission from the Crown to Sir Eyre Coote, as Commander in Chief of the King's Forces, who were inclined, while that commission subsisted, to acknowledge no authority but what was derived under it, as rendering him independent, in relation to the King's Forces, of the Company's authority. On going to Bengal, he thought proper to delegate his authority to Major General Stuart, over

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In treating of this, the President shews his gross ignorance of military matters, in saying, that my powers in command are different from those of the late Commander in Chief, because I have not a special commission. Contrary, however, to the assertion, they are exactly the same regarding the disputed matters, even without that commission; and I am the Commander in Chief of his Majesty's forces for the time being, and the person in station to whom all military orders or regulations, and the acts of parliament, refer; indeed it is of the essence of military service and order, that it should be so, and nothing but design or ignorance could call it in question.

(4.) *I come now to answer, as short as I can, to all the reasoning which I think false, (contained betwixt the words referred to in the margin*;) and say most assuredly, that there were no means with the Army under my Command to proceed with any hopes of success against the French in Cuddalore, until the 28th of May, after all the rice was landed from the Resolution store-ship at Conjamere; and as to the steps I took before as well as after that day, I shall for the present appeal to the regular suite of connected daily Letters from me to Government, accompanied by a state of the rice, and the means of carriage with the Army;— My Letters to Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes from April to the latest period, shall also be presented for the information of this Government, and of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and to our Honourable Employers. In short,*

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a considerable part of the King's troops sent to the Company's assistance. It might have materially impeded the public service, if there had been a clashing of jurisdictions between the operation of the King's commission, and the orders of the Company's Representatives, by the failure of the Governor General and Council to give any directions as to military operations; the former and ordinary authority and obligations of this Presidency to direct them necessarily revived; the measures to be taken rested upon them; but the instruments were not, under the circumstances just related, entirely in their choice.

(4.) They resolved, that the Carnatic or main army should attack the French troops, separated from Tippoo by the necessity of his retiring to his country, in consequence of the war having been at length carried into it. The French were confessedly inferior in strength; they had no retreat upon the coast, but a place which General Stuart declared to be indefensible. General Stuart, it was to be hoped, would attack without great apprehension of danger in that state, and without giving the enemy time to put it in a better state. Every objection made by him to the immediate march of the army was overcome, by an immediate provision of some of the supplies he wanted, and by shewing that the others already were supplied in the abundance that he wished. The necessity of an expeditious march towards the enemy; the necessity of an expedi-

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every Letter of mine that I know of, during the interesting period from April 21st to July 2d, when I was abruptly recalled, and the exclusive deputation negotiating with the French at Cuddalore was known in our camp; I shall endeavour, I say, before the present dispatches close, to furnish all these materials, offering it as the closest and clearest mode of reasoning by appeal to dates and facts, and not by closet language or ignorant theory, however dogmatically contained on paper.

(5.) In answer (to the eight pages referred to in the margin*,) I shall, in addition to the Letters above-mentioned, comprise in one return, the dates of all the Letters I have received from the Presidency, and when received; also in like manner the Letters to and from Colonel Fullarton;—to and from Mr. Sullivan, Resident at Tanjore;—and the Minute in Committee, giving me a latitude for the co-operation of the Southern force;—and I shall cite the Letters, giving the reasons why I wished and ordered the junction, even before the the Army had to struggle with almost the whole combined force of France in India by land and from the sea, and when (June 16) the exigency increased after his Majesty's fleet ceased to support or co-operate with us at Cuddalore;—all this shall appear without any vague penmanship, or reclus sophistry, on my part, but, as already observed, from stubborn facts and dates, and practical inferences, which the soldier in the ranks is equally sensible of with the General; circumstances which may indeed be misrepresented from design, but of which none can really doubt, but those who are short-sighted

* Referring to the written copy.

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tious attack of Cuddalore, if they should venture into it, were laid before the General in Committee, in the strongest terms. These considerations appeared to be the more necessary, as not only the probability, but the importance of the capture of Cuddalore, and the French troops in it, depended exceedingly on the dispatch with which the attack would be undertaken. The capture was more probable to be effected, while his Majesty's fleet maintained a windward station to the enemy, while supplies could be safely sent from hence to the besiegers by sea, and before the enemy's fleet could have had time to come to Cuddalore to encourage the besieged by its presence, and assist them with its stores, its provisions, and its men; before part of their wants could be supplied by convoys from the westward; before they should have time to supply the defects of the fortifications by entrenchments and redoubts; and before Tippoo Saib could have time, were he inclined, to return to the Carnatic to the relief of his allies. The capture was more important, if effected in time, to send from the main army such a reinforcement to the southern forces marching to the westward, as should prevent Tippoo Saib from establishing himself solidly in his inherited and recovered dominions, and from pursuing the advantages gained by him over General Mathews; more important, if effected before the French Fleet could arrive at Cuddalore to take away the gar-

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from natural weakness, and this is the best apology that such a doubting will admit of.

There seems however (to run through these eight * pages), a strong propensity to give an unfavourable impression, as if from premeditated design I had concealed the dates when Letters were received, or entirely to suppress their contents. It is with me to despise such suspicions—I had no design, other than is known from my correspondence;—I did nothing from a fear of disobeying at times the Letter of Instructions, when I thought the public service required it, and there was not time for reference.—I did nothing with an intention to disobey.—I did nothing to court favour.—I had nothing in view but the public service.

For what reason then am I suspected of dissimulation?—But I will tell Lord Macartney, who is so full of suspicions and suppositions, and whom I have solely and constantly in view in this Answer, and in plain English too; that several of the Letters which he supposed I received, and which I did not receive in regular course, are now in the hands of M. Buffy, who I know has spoken, and I have heard has wrote, his sentiments very candidly, upon the illiberality and injustice with which I have been treated.

Expressions of perversion, intended dilatoriness, wilful concealment of information, procrastination, &c. are used in the Minute, of the President, which warrant the suitable return, on my part towards that person who originally framed the Minute, and the only excuse I have to make to those who have the best right

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rison: the captivity of which was the chief object of the expedition, the temporary possession of the place being of no sort of consequence to either party; and, lastly, if effected, so as that the garrison should be embarked for Europe before the account of the expected pacification from Europe, would leave in India men who, ceasing to be the enemies, would not cease to be the rivals of the British nation, and who would give immediate effect to any cession of territory, or any footing to which the treaty might admit them, as well as opportunity of improving such a footing to the Company's future insecurity and detriment. Major General Stuart marched from hence the 21st of April. He did not meet, he was not apprehensive of meeting, any resistance in the road; he did not, however, arrive at Cuddalore till June; the length is little more than one hundred miles; the march, at a common rate and allowing for accidents, is not more than twelve days; the carriage of provisions actually with the army was avowedly for double the number of those days; on his road there was provided a large magazine of provisions; a swift sailing ship was taken up to land him provisions at Pondicherry, within about a day's march of the Bound Hedge of Cuddalore; every effort was made to prevent his wants, to ensure his success, to satisfy his wishes. But this march of twelve days he made a march of forty days, and in this march did not equal the average of three miles a day. The

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to judge betwixt us, for the expressions thus forced from me by a continued sense (now brought to the highest pitch) of malignant misrepresentation of my conduct, in the most material crisis of my life, and I hope they will admit of my apology and excuse, when they see that it is a personal defence on my part against a most unjust personal attack.

(6) The assertions and reasonings of this Right Honourable President (within the space mentioned in the margin), are of such a nature, that I trust what I have to say in observation upon them, will be the means to shew both his Lordship, and the real state of facts, in a true point of view.*

I did not, until reading the passages in question, believe it was possible for the human heart with the worst intentions towards me, to attempt to give an unfavourable view of my conduct on the 13th of last June; but it is otherwise, and the case now exists in this minute; I comfort myself however, and congratulate human society, on a general observation, and on this particular example, that the head does not always keep pace with the heart,—on the contrary, at times, is the means of exposing it.

But to proceed; first, I aver, that, be the authors who they may, of what is called the best intelligence from camp, as stated by this Right Honourable President, who say, "that by procrastination the enemy "were enabled to erect very formidable "works, &c. and that the murmurs of the "Army were what at length produced the "attack of the enemy's works on the 13th

* Referring to the written copy.

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ship intended to land provisions for him at Pondicherry, nearer to Cuddalore, he chose should land them at Conjamere, farther from Cuddalore. He halted near such station, under the idea of waiting for the whole cargo to be landed there, until he expended nearly as much provisions as he brought to him; as if he could not pursue his route, directing the ship to proceed to meet him again in a more forward part of his intended route. The slowness of his march had the same effect upon his carriage-cattle as could the most rapid movements and incessant fatigue: He reports them to be diminished beyond the example of any former reduction, though none were taken, destroyed, or dispersed by the enemy.

(5) The General, to guard against the most remote events that might be adverse, obtained an eventual authority from the Select Committee, to order a part of the Southern army to his assistance, in case the same should be indispensably necessary; that Southern army was usefully, and indeed essentially employed, in protecting the Company's territories and dependencies to the Southward of the river Coleroon, and in carrying from thence the war successfully into the enemy's country, in dividing and distracting that enemy's attention, and contributing so far in preventing him from being able, if he were inclined, to come to the relief of his threatened allies at Cuddalore. This authority

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"of June;" — I say, whoever were the authors of such report so greedily swallowed, and thus, for record, stated in the Minute by Lord Macartney, they have told a most infamous falsehood; and I repeat that nothing but a determined perversion of facts, as stated in my daily correspondence, especially from June 9th to June 13th, with the worst design towards me, could have in my absence led to state such reports to this or to any other government.

The real truth, and which, when stated as I shall do, ought to raise a blush, if possible, somewhere, is; that every preparation to receive us had been made by the enemy on the north or north west side of Cuddalore, and no man in either Army knew that I meant to turn all their works thus prepared, until nearly the last day's march (June 7th), through the jungle; it is so stated in my daily correspondence, to which I refer on this and every occasion.

The delay upon the whole route from Chingleput, which that correspondence will also account for, did not therefore operate on the works on that side of Cuddalore, which I from the outset meant to attack.

On the 7th of June, as before observed, we came to that very ground, after a most fatiguing march, never before entirely opened by any Army; and after coming to this new ground we had some skirmishing with the enemy during good part of that day.

Does this Governor General think we could move into Cuddalore, opposed by

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over that army appeared, however, the less in danger of being exercised, and consequently less likely to interrupt those good effects, that General Stuart had avowed that the army he then had under his command was sufficient for the enemy he had to encounter, and that upon the unexpected arrival of reinforcements here from Europe, a very few days before the General's march from hence, a large proportion of that reinforcement was immediately destined to follow him, as a resource against accidents, or unexpected difficulties, and this addition was likely to arrive, and did arrive, with others, at Cuddalore, before any could from the Southern army.

The General, obtaining this discretionary authority over the Southern army, on the condition of exercising it only in the case of indispensable necessity, exercised it however without any such necessity, before the possibility of any such necessity, and before even he marched from the Presidency. It was an abuse of the confidence placed in him, and a perversion, as well as disobedience, of orders; and the order he issued, so contrary to the letter, the spirit, the intention of the Committee, is forwarded, as being not merely the exercise of discretionary power placed in him without condition, but the actual exercise of the judgment and authority of the Committee. A copy of this order was not obtained from the General, though sent from hence on the 20th of April, until the 14th day of May, after re-

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three thousand two hundred European regular troops, (*as was the case the day we arrived*) immediately upon our arriving at the ground, with the same easy steps as his Lordship moves from his cabinet to the Council Board with his Minute Batteries? or where, in all his reading, does he know of an Army so situated, with so much depending at sea in point of materials and provisions, beginning their operations more expeditiously than this very army did?

By some mistake at sea, as mentioned in my Letters, a delay was occasioned during the day after we came to the ground (June 8th); but on the 9th, our operations began against the enemy, though in the midst of difficulties about landing stores, &c. at the beach, and bringing them from thence.

The enemy had therefore, in fact, only three or four days at most to do whatever they did, before we drove them in.— I determined on the General attack of their out-posts the 12th, to take place the morning following. It is an absolute falsehood, to my knowledge, that any man in the army murmured; it is an absolute falsehood, that I was advised or prompted to that measure by any man, or by any thing, but by the sense of my duty, and an eager desire, from principle, to carry on the service to the best advantage, according to my professional local knowledge and experience as an Officer, and at the head of the bravest and best disposed Army for their numbers, that ever served their country in this or any other climate.

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peated applications to him, and a declaration, that unless it were communicated, his discretionary authority should be withdrawn: such an abuse of authority required indeed an effort to conceal it; but after it was discovered, the General still wished to draw the Southern army under his command, though the chief reason he alleged was, the possibility of Tipoo's return to the Carnatic; though such return was against the obvious interests of Tipoo, who was sufficiently employed in the recovery and preservation of his own country; though, by returning to the Carnatic, he might lose the benefit of the stipulation in the Marrattah treaty in favour of his father; though the Southern army employed in the attack of part of his territories was, while so employed, more likely to keep him from the Carnatic, than if his dominions were in quiet, and his arms at leisure to move to the deliverance of his allies; as, if he should be bent on such deliverance, the Southern army would not be still in time to follow it into the Carnatic.—The General, though he shifted his ground in demanding again the command over the Southern army, in conjunction with that of the Carnatic, and did not even plead an indispensable necessity, was still in hopes of prevailing upon the Committee, and in that hope declared to them, that he should send no orders for the march of the Southern army till he should know the sentiments of the Committee, as was the original intention, and his ab-

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The plan for the attack was my own; and I had, previous to any consultation, separately and deliberately considered the component parts of it for two entire days; and yet the secret remained entirely with myself.

The observation therefore of this President, in his Minute 25th of June, that it was difficult to effect, uncertain in the event, and caused much slaughter, &c. is altogether impertinent; and although Lord Macartney or others, may deny to the army and to me who had the honour to command; the praise which the Honest Heart would cheerfully give, yet our Sovereign, our Honourable Employers, and the voice of our country, will, as we trust, give it liberally and cheerfully;—Our enemies have done so, and I am under the necessity to appeal both to their feelings, and to their Letters and conversations publicly known.

(7.) In regard to what is said of my intentions, represented as with duplicity, in writing to the Admiral immediately after taking up our ground South of Cuddalore, with my opinion (given at first), of the time it might require to carry the place; my Answer is, by an appeal from disingenuous insinuations and sophistical suppositions, to the dates and contents of the whole of the correspondence with Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, from first to last; and as to my intended concealments in correspondence with this Government, that correspondence will speak for itself also.

My plan to occupy our last ground of encampment, and the route I was to take

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solute duty: Thus he wrote to the Committee on the 26th of May, and on the same 26th day of that month, the Committee positively wrote to him to send no orders to the Southern army, but upon the condition and in the circumstances of indispensable necessity, on which he alone was originally empowered.—This letter, according to the usual course of the messengers, ought to have reached him at farthest on the 31st of May; yet on that day, without acknowledging the Committee's letter, he sends the most positive order, and without even supposing any event which could occasion the necessity of it, for the march towards him of the Southern forces.—Either by some accident unexplained, he did not wait to receive the Committee's letter by the 31st of May, and gave therefore wrong information to the Committee of his intention to wait for such receipt, or he did in the usual course actually receive it, but finding it contrary to his wishes, he dispatched a letter directly contrary to it, under the screen from a charge of disobedience, of not receiving in time the Committee's orders, and when hereafter he should acknowledge the subsequent receipt of such orders, and of similar orders sent in duplicate and triplicate, he hoped for the resource of finding the Southern army so far advanced towards him, as to furnish an excuse for not obeying orders given on a supposition of its being differently situated. Those subsequent letters,

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to get at it, was concealed from Government, and from every one else; and luckily it was so, otherwise the works which this President misrepresents as formidable, would really have become so.

I shall say nothing here concerning the deputation to Cuddalore, recommended in the President's Minute of the 25th ult.; or of the singularity that I, the General of the Army, and a Member of the efficient Political Government, should be excluded from that deputation, and a place given to a private Gentleman not in the Company's Service, but only a private friend of the President; neither shall I here state the very unprecedented mode of conveying the General Orders to the Army; and giving the Command of the King's, as well as Company's Troops in the Field, to another Officer in his Majesty's Service, and consequently immediately under my Orders, while I was yet with the Army, without any previous notice to me, or reason given for such an irregularity and palpable affront.

Suffice it to say, I have submitted to this, as an act of the Company's Government, in whose Service I am, but in so far only as was consistent with my Station in the Command of his Majesty's Forces, as expressed in the Papers communicated by me to Government from July 2d inclusive; and yet after thus submitting, I will not debar myself from the observation I mean now to add, and with which I conclude, That this and the whole of what I have felt personally dis-

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though he denies not the receipt of them, he defers answering, until, he says, he shall have time; but he defers likewise obeying the orders contained in those letters, and the delay of doing that, which is desired to be done without delay, is a positive disobedience. If the mere abstracted fact of disobedience to the orders of the Committee had been a motive operating upon its conduct, the misconduct of General Stuart in the instances noticed to him in their letter of the 20th of March, and in various instances since, would have already affected the situation of General Stuart; but this habit of disobedience is adduced as a ground against reckoning steadfastly on his future obedience. The public welfare is liable to be injured by a neglect of the orders given to promote it, by the prosecution of an opposite system on the part of those who were to execute those orders, and even by a concealment of circumstances within their observations; whatever obstructions might have occurred in the march, which could yield only to time, no obstructions could have occurred after the march was over, and the army opposite the enemy, which delay would not strengthen them; yet after that arrival, the enemy was suffered to have time to recover from its surprize, to gain confidence from the tardiness of their opponents, and to encrease their means of resistance. The consequence of tardy measures must,

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agreeable, seems to me to have originated in the same perturbed muddy source;— and I have innocently a sort of malicious pleasure and comfort, in thinking that the Governor General and Council of Bengal, together with our late most worthy Commander in Chief, and also Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, have at different times been under the same predicament,—I am not therefore the only one that has reason to complain. And in hopes that the Conduct of the President will make no impression unfavourable to me, I shall for the present conclude without other observation or reflection than what I have been thus forced, from recent intended injury, to make in this representation, which I desire may accompany the President's Minute of the 25th ult., and to be forwarded along with it to our Honourable Employers, and to the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

(Signed)

JAM^S STUART.

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no doubt, be tardy success. General Stuart declares to the Admiral, that it will require seven weeks to ensure the capture of Cuddalore, together with the presence of his Majesty's fleet before it. Nothing indeed could verify such a declaration, but a determination to be inactive six out of those seven weeks. But such a declaration, if not sincere, was highly blameworthy, and might be dangerous. The General knew that the fleet was declared by the Admiral to be straitened for water and provisions. If the reduction of Cuddalore was likely to require the presence of the fleet for a short time only, the Admiral might be induced, by staying that time, to expose his men to inconveniencies, which were to have a speedy termination, and would be productive of public advantage: but seven weeks was a period, beyond the term already announced by the Admiral for his return to Madras, to which it was not in the smallest degree likely that he would protract his absence from it; announcing to him that a shorter stay would in fact prove useless, was not encouraging him to make any stay in Cuddalore roads, in order to alarm the besieged, to deprive them of the opportunity of receiving supplies, damp their hope of relief, and the consequent spirit of persisting in defence.

(6) It is possible, indeed, that the General might have been sincere in the declaration he thus had made, if it be

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true what is mentioned in the most intelligent advices from camp, that the procrastination of his operations had enabled the enemy to erect very formidable works; that the further protraction of such delay might even endanger the success of the whole expedition; and that the murmurs of the army was what at length produced that attack of the enemy's works on the 13th of June, which was difficult to effect, uncertain in event, and occasioned much slaughter of the King's and Company's troops, from no other cause than because time was given, even after the arrival of the army by land, and of the reinforcements from hence by sea, to erect such works; and which, if allowed to be strengthened by the labour of a few days more, would be still more costly of men's lives, and more difficult to carry. But if he thought that such a delay was likely, or even possible, if he had formed a judgment in his mind, and had really considered the operations as likely to consume the number of seven weeks from the date of his letter to the Admiral the 9th instant; (7.) to conceal this judgment or opinion from the Government under whom he acted, from whom he was to receive his support, and on whose knowledge and discretion the plans for the public welfare depended; not to impart to that Government every calculation he made, every apprehension he felt, and every precaution that oc-

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curred to him to be necessary, and thus to keep such Government in the dark on subjects on which it was his duty to give them all the light he had or could procure, was indeed a culpable concealment: It was a concealment the more culpable, that, while he commanded, he had the power to verify the negative sense of his prediction. It was clearly in his power not to take it in less than seven weeks; but not taking it before, events might happen to prevent his best intentions of taking it then or afterwards, or if he took it, of deriving from it the essential advantages which its early capture might have produced in its extensive influence on other operations. If the General's declaration were to have weight, the surrender of Cuddalore must be uncertain, since the return of Sir Edward Hughes with the fleet to Madras. Such, however, is the inferiority and comparative weakness of the French troops, evinced in the loss of their strong intrenchments and redoubts, and acknowledged, in their seeking for retreat and shelter behind the feeble walls of Cuddalore, that it is scarcely possible to desire to take it, without succeeding in that desire.

But whether it be taken at this late period, or it be still besieged, is become already likely to be of little consequence. The happy event of peace between the Sovereigns of the besiegers and besieged being known to have taken place, the several corrob-

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ating circumstances attending the account of this event, though it has not as yet come officially, leave no doubt of the fact. The terms of the treaty are now before the Committee. Hostilities are to cease between his Britannic Majesty and his most Christian Majesty, their kingdoms, states, and subjects, by sea and land, in all parts of the world. After a thorough conviction of the truth of the fact, it would be a wanton, useless, and criminal disregard of the feelings of humanity to continue, or even to risk, the effusion of human blood, under the pretence that official notice of such fact had not as yet arrived. It is probable it will soon arrive; but accidents might retard its arrival for a considerable time. In that interval, whether short or long, the continuance of the contest here could not alter the terms of the treaty, and the loss of one man's life would be more than this Government could justify, if the

• Governor Hornby's Letter as communicated by Mr. Andrew Ross.

Extract from Mr. Ramsay's Letter, containing Letter from the Secretary of State, as communicated by Mr. De Souza.

The foreign Gazettes, containing the several circumstances attending the Signature of the preliminaries, the consequent notice and debate in Parliament.

The articles of the treaty abridged. The articles at length taken from the English Papers as communicated by Mr. Benfield.

Mr. Maxwell's account of the ratification, and the arrival at Bombay of two persons from Paris in consequence of it.

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French Government or Governor be willing to accede to an immediate cessation of arms.

The President therefore proposes, that a flag of truce be immediately sent to Monsieur de Buffy, commander in chief of the French forces, and representative of that nation in India, communicating to him that event, with a copy of the treaty, and proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities ashore, as well as by sea, with the consent of the Admiral Sir Edward Hughes. It is probable that no political motives will prevent the troops in a town taken or besieged from listening to the dictates of humanity, in accelerating the moment of pacification. In all events the President is of opinion, that the British arms should not, for the future, be otherwise employed against the subjects of his most Christian Majesty, than in a defence, if necessary, from their attacks, or in preventing any attempt by force to march through countries in the dependence of the Company, in order to assist the Company's Indian enemies, who have not yet acceded to any treaty.—If the French should be still in possession of Cuddalore, on the arrival of the Presidency's dispatches, the President consequently moves, that the Carnatic army shall immediately cease its operations against it. The body of the army to remain merely as a corps of observation, till answer from Monsieur Buffy shall be known at the Presidency, and orders sent in con-

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sequence to the army, whose movements must in the mean time be regulated by the facility of subsistence near Cuddalore or Chillumbrum, or by approaching to the magazine at Perma-coil, or even Chingleput; attending likewise to the prevention of any successful attempt by the remains of Tippoo's straggling troops in the Carnatic, or any march of French troops to join them, Tippoo being still at war with the English nation and Company, whose possessions on the Malabar coast are at this time attacked or threatened by him, as well as the Carnatic still infested by some of his cavalry.—His attempts must still be repelled by force. The southern army, on whose vigorous and immediate efforts, the prosperity of the Company's affairs on the other side of the Peninsula, is on all hands allowed to depend in great measure, must be directed to continue those vigorous measures, as far as the same can be practicable and prudent; and to render them entirely so, nothing can be wanted but a strong detachment from the main army, against which there cannot remain the possibility of any objection.

The President therefore proposes, that upon communication with Mr. Sullivan resident of Tanjore, who will provide boats and boatmen across the Coleroon, and all other necessary supplies, a body of 500 Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, with a sufficient proportion of artillery and Eu-

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ropean artillerymen, do immediately pass that river, and march to join the southern army. *If Colonel Fullarton has crossed the Coleroon, he is to go back, and prosecute his former operations.*—The Carnatic army may possibly then be still almost as numerous in Europeans, as when it marched from the Presidency, and will be much more than equal to any native force that could be opposed to it, before it might reach the Presidency.—For the punctual execution of those necessary measures, the President cannot, from the observations this Minute contains in relation to Major General Stuart, rely on the obedience of that officer; and he has been therefore compelled to remind the Committee of these circumstances, as grounding the necessity of calling that Commander to the Presidency, from whence, as he has a seat and voice in the Committee on military affairs, he should be as little absent as possible.—When he returns, the Committee will have an opportunity of hearing from him, at length, whatever he may have to adduce in justification of his conduct. But the Committee know enough to be themselves without any justification, if they were to depend upon him for the future.—The death of the commander in chief of the King's forces, putting an end to the delegation from him to General Stuart, puts an end to every apology for continuing him at the head of the troops in the field.—The Committee is answerable now for the instruments,

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as well as the measures it adopts.— The personal qualifications and dispositions of the former are as much in the exercise of its duty, the objects of its consideration, as the propriety and practicability of the latter.— The commander in chief does not necessarily go to the field; and may be necessary in the cabinet. Younger and more active officers, and more ready to execute the commands of Government, are preferable on the present occasion. The officers now at the head of the Southern army have given equal satisfaction, both in exertions of spirit, and in precaution of prudence, and deserve therefore to be continued on a service where they have been successfully tried, and have the advantage of local experience, and the affection and confidence of the troops. Major General Bruce, who, at Cuddalore, has verified his reputation as a good and gallant officer, is recommended to assume the Command of the Carnatic Army while in the Field, and to be aided, on account of his late arrival in the country, with a Council of War, of such of the Principal Officers as are best acquainted with it; and the orders for the return of Major General Stuart to the Presidency, and the assumption of the Command by General Bruce, to be delivered to them by an officer dispatched from hence for the purpose of securing the consequence and delivery of such orders, and the due obedience to them. The vigorous prosecution of the war against Tippoo, is not for the purpose of prolonging the War, but of accele-

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rating Peace, with that native power, agreeable to the Spirit of the Treaty made in Europe; and in conformity to it the President moves, That it be proposed in the Letter to Mr. Bussy, that Tippoo Sahib be invited to accede to the General Pacification, agreeably to the 16th Article of the present Treaty with France, and on such terms as may be agreed upon between him and the Governor General and Council of Bengal, or this Presidency, with their consent and approbation.— But it is in the mean time the duty of this Government to exert every power within its reach against the Company's enemies, while they continue such; and therefore he proposes, and urges the continuation of the expedition against the northern parts of Tippoo's Territories; and for the purpose of rendering its effects more extensive and more secure, he proposes that Colonel Jones may take the Command of the whole, with the principal part of the Troops, Europeans, and Natives now under its command, together with those lately under the command of Captain Edmonds, and that Major Lyfaght may be second in command in the expedition, and that all such provision be made, and precaution taken without delay, as may be conducive to promote the success of this undertaking; but whatever may be expected either from this Northern or the Southern Army, it may come much too late for the preservation of Mangalore, which, by the last advices, must be now closely besieged by Tippoo's Army. The fall of such a place would, it is supposed,

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be soon followed by the fall of Telli-cherry, and the Company's other possessions on the coast of Malabar; to send, therefore, immediate relief to Mangalore is virtually relieving the places depending on its fate. Its immediate wants are Gunpowder, Provisions, and Troops, chiefly officers; it is possible to spare from this garrison and neighbourhood about 300 European Privates, who, together with their officers, and some additional officers, might be sent, together with Gunpowder and Provisions; but both the importance of such a supply, and the necessity of its quickly reaching the other coast, call for the safest and quickest method of conveyance, which the Admiral alone can furnish;—The President therefore proposes that the Admiral be requested to furnish such

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frigates and quick sailing transports, as may be able to sail from hence without delay, and are likely to arrive expeditiously at Mangalore with the above mentioned supplies.—The President concludes by proposing, that Letters be immediately written to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, communicating the late events, the consequent measures of this Government, and strongly expressive of the necessity of instructions already demanded, but not obtained, on those points where their approbation is by law made necessary, except in particular cases, or where, from their exclusive knowledge of their negotiations, and connections with the country powers, their advice would be instructive and useful.

The Committee having taken into consideration, and fully discussed, the several important matters contained in the foregoing Minute, concur in sentiments with the President, and approve of the measures his Lordship has proposed; Sir Edward Hughes only observing, that respecting that part of the Minute which relates to the conduct of General Stuart, *he* of course cannot judge of it.

RESOLVED ACCORDINGLY,

That a flag of truce be immediately sent to Monsieur De Buffy, communicating to him the event of a pacification having taken place between his Majesty and his most Christian Majesty, a copy of the Treaty, and proposing to him an immediate cessation of hostilities ashore, as well as by sea, with the consent of the Admiral Sir Edward Hughes.

RESOLVED,

That orders be sent to the army for all operations against Cuddalore immediately to cease, the body of the army to remain merely as a Corps of Observation, till Mr. Buffy's answer shall be known.

RESOLVED,

That a detachment of 500 European infantry, and two complete battalions of Sepoys, with a proper proportion of field pieces and European artillery-men be ordered from the main army to join the Southern army, unless some unforeseen circumstances should render the execution of this measure too dangerous to be attempted immediately; in which case Colonel Fullarton, as well as this Committee, to be apprised of the delay and the causes of it, and the order to be carried into execution as soon afterwards as possible; Mr. Sullivan to be apprised of the intended march of the detachment, and directed to take the necessary measures for convoying it across the Coleroon. *Colonel Fullarton, if he should have crossed to the northward of the Coleroon, to be ordered to return and prosecute his former operations.*

RESOLVED,

That it is necessary, upon the grounds stated in the President's Minute, and deduced from uncontrovertible facts, that General Stuart should be recalled to the Presidency: that he be therefore recalled, and directed to deliver over the command of the Carnatic army in the field to Major General Bruce, and to proceed himself to the Presidency with all convenient expedition.

RESOLVED,

That a letter be written to Major General Bruce, desiring him to assume the command of the Carnatic army in the field; and, on account of his late arrival in the country, recommending to him, in particular and important occasions, to call to his assistance a council of war, consisting of such of the principal officers as he may judge most capable, and best acquainted with military service in the country.

RESOLVED,

That a general order, notifying General Stuart's recal to the Presidency, and the appointment of General Bruce to the command of the Carnatic army in the field, be sent to the Adjutant-General, with a letter, directing him to publish it to the army.

RESOLVED,

That it be proposed in the Letter to Monsieur Buffy, that Tippoo Sahib be invited to accede to the general pacification, agreeably to the 16th Article of the

present treaty with France, and on such terms as may be agreed upon between him and the Governor General and Council of Bengal, or this Presidency, with their consent and approbation.

RESOLVED,

That in the mean while the war be prosecuted with vigour against Tippoo Sahib, until we are ascertained of his pacific intentions, and that the invasion of his country to the northward be continued; and that for that purpose Colonel Jones be directed to proceed with the principal part of the troops, European and native, under his command, and join Captain Edmonds: That Major Lyfaght be continued second in command on the expedition, and that instructions be drawn up for Colonel Jones, agreeably to what the President has recommended.

RESOLVED,

That a reinforcement, and supplies of gunpowder and provisions, as recommended by the President, be sent immediately, if possible, to Mangalore; and that the Admiral be requested to furnish ships to convoy them.

RESOLVED,

That a Letter be written to the Governor General and Council as recommended by the President.

The Committee having resolved to send a Flag of Truce to Mr. De Buffy, it is now farther resolved, with the concurrence of the Admiral, that a joint deputation from the Committee and the Admiral be appointed to proceed with it in his Majesty's ship the Medea, which the Admiral consents to furnish for that purpose.

RESOLVED,

That the said deputation shall consist of two gentlemen on the part of the Select Committee, and one on the part of the Admiral; and that the former be Anthony Sadlier, Esq; second Member of the Select Committee, and G. L. Staunton, Esq; a gentleman in the confidence of this Government, eminently qualified for such a commission. The Admiral intimates to the Committee, that he will determine this afternoon, on the gentleman to be appointed of the deputation on his part.

ORDERED,

That a commission and instructions for the Deputation, and a Letter for Mr. De Buffy, be drawn up as soon as possible, and that the whole matter be finally adjusted the day after to-morrow.

